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ABSTRACT: Two aspects of Miranda Fricker’s book are criticised: the implicit assumption that ethical theory can 
solve fundamental problems in epistemology, and the excessive reliance on testimony as a fundamental 
source of knowledge. Against the former, it is argued that ethical theories are based on cultural prejudices 
to a higher extent than epistemological theories. Against the latter, argumentation is proposed as a more 
important epistemic practice than testimony. 
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I have a feeling inside, 
and intuition’s always been a woman’s guide. 
Shakira, Pure intuition 
Y qué le voy a hacer, si yo 
nací en el Mediterráneo. 
(‘And what can I do, if I was born at the Mediterranean?’) 
Joan Manuel Serrat, Mediterráneo. 
 
Having devoted a big part of my research to understanding the social constitution of 
knowledge from the point of view of (rational) action theory, it will not be me who 
will deny the importance of illuminating, as Miranda Fricker does in her impressive 
book Epistemic Injustice, the connection, or connections, between epistemic values and 
other aspects of practical reason. But I confess I have certain prejudices against the 
kind of approach chosen by her. Since my comment must be brief, my complaints are 
abundant and serious, and my English is poor, I fear that what follows will sound as 
too sanguine at times; I apologise for that, and insist in the fact that the book contains 
a lot of interesting and relevant arguments; it is just that I am concentrating on what I 
do not like. To make a long story short: I feel that, compared to epistemology and 
philosophy of science, moral philosophy is a bit of a mess, and hence the danger of 
falling into confusions and prejudices by analysing epistemic concepts by means of 
moral ones is more than big. I insist in recognising that probably my attitude is ‘just’ a 
prejudice, but the arguments I have seen until now against it had not made me stop 
thinking the way I do. This does not entail that I don’t take the study of prejudices in-
teresting, or even essential, but I prefer to ground the study on an epistemic approach, 
rather than on an ethical one, at least as far as these two approaches can be kept separate. 
 I say this because I feel (again, it’s a question of feelings) that the main aim of 
Fricker’s book is to show how bad some type of epistemic prejudices are, rather than to 
explain why they are bad (I mean: the latter goal is instrumental for the former), so 
that the book responds basically to a moral or political agenda, and, in such a case, we 
all know that epistemological considerations run the risk of being distorted by our 
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non-epistemic goals. An easy example of this risk refers to the central concept of 
Fricker’s work: justice. There are plenty of mutually incompatible theories about what 
justice “consists in”; still worse, what things do seem just or unjust to people is strongly 
dependent on lots of social and cultural factors, many of them not too well under-
stood. One can be more or less sympathetic to Fricker’s views on what actions consti-
tute an ‘injustice’ (and I am extremely sympathetic!), but I would not like to ground a ra-
tional, scientific explanation of what is to have a prejudice, and what consequences fol-
low from having it, on my own moral prejudices, not more than I would like to develop 
a theory about nutrition just on the ground of my own gastronomic tastes. In some 
way, this is even probably detrimental to me, for I might exploit Fricker’s theory to 
apply it to the case at hand: not-anglo-saxon-based-analytic-philosophers, whose pa-
pers are systematically ignored or regarded as irrelevant by their colleagues from UK 
or US universities (who simply ‘smell the accent in the writing’ in a way I can not); 
Fricker’s book could provide me with good arguments to show to the analytic-
philosophy community that they suffer from a ‘testimonial prejudice’ against people 
who work out of the circle, but I shall resist the temptation, for I want to be faithful 
to my own positivist, fact-value-dicotomish prejudices, and keep here (just here) the 
discussion only at the level of epistemology. 
  Being persuaded ex ante, as I am, of how wrong it is to exclude people from the 
community of knowers, the major part of Fricker’s arguments seem to me, if not re-
dundant, at least a little bit superfluous, constantly insisting in the part of the problem 
that is more ethically laden and less in the questions one can see behind the ones 
Fricker discusses most of the time. Of course it is unjust to deny a person the status of a 
reasoner! Of course this is detrimental to her capacity of becoming an autonomous 
agent! And of course this is often based on identity prejudices! (I agree particularly on 
this —all identities are nothing but clusters of prejudices). After all, isn’t knowing 
these obvious things an essential component of our western, twenty-first century 
prejudices? But we knew them long before we were said that testimonial injustice is a 
species of epistemic injustice on its own, and I don’t think that people are going to be 
moved a little bit further because they learn that denying somebody the status as a 
witness or informant is a supplemental wrong we made to her besides having denied 
to her the access to culture and education (which, from my point of view, is the sum-
mum malum of all epistemic injustices). The question is, what does all this show us 
about the nature and working of knowledge? Fricker obviously resorts to the episte-
mology of testimony as that part of the current debate in epistemology that can do the 
best job in her strategy, and there she finds what I think is the most interesting contri-
bution of her book to that debate: the necessity of taking ‘testimonial justice’ as a con-
stitutive epistemic virtue, together with sincerity and accuracy. 
 Unfortunately, epistemic virtue theory is too much contaminated by the mixing of 
ethical and epistemological concerns. The problem is that most virtues, if not all, are 
strongly culture dependent and subjective: what is a virtue for me can be a vice for 
you. This makes virtues unsuitable to serve as the ground for a philosophical theory of 
anything, less still epistemology! If we identify something that sounds like a virtue, and 
without which we think no epistemic social system could ‘work’, perhaps we are sim-
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ply enslaved by the limits of our imagination, and systems very different from those 
exist or are conceivable (by others). Furthermore, if there are some ‘epistemic virtues’ 
which are a universal possibility condition on all social knowledge systems, surely this 
will be due to the biological properties of our cognitive apparatuses, and so, in order 
to grasp them in an appropriate way, it will be better to start our philosophical investi-
gation just studying neuroscience, rather than ethics. On the other hand, the fact that 
virtues are comparative entails that one has to study how a social knowledge system can 
work with different people having those virtues in different degrees. One has to re-
flect, so to say, not on what would happen if people were not accurate, or just in their 
testimonial attributions, but what would it happen if different combinations of degrees 
in different virtues existed: perhaps it is possible that some societies ‘work’ with a low 
level of justice and a high level of accuracy and sincerity (and viceversa), and what is 
worse for epistemic virtue theory, perhaps people would prefer to live in a society 
where virtues are not always exemplified at the maximum degree, for being virtuous is 
costly, sometimes even for other people. Besides developing a theory (or catechism?) 
telling us how to be virtuous in epistemic matters, we epistemologists should offer a 
theory about the possible social knowledge systems, their pros and cons, and how to 
extract the maximum profit from them (even at the cost of being a little bit vicious 
sometimes). If there exists an economy of prejudices, as Fricker says, what we need is a 
powerful economics about them, and not only an ethics! I do not deny the importance of 
having such an ethics (actually, I would approve our having lots of mutually incom-
patible epistemic ethics; after all, de moralibus gustibus non est disputandum), but it is also 
necessary to understand how that economy works, not only how it should work. 
 Lastly, another aspect I do not like in the book is its insistence on testimony. I ac-
knowledge that this was the ‘forgotten’ side in previous work on epistemology, and 
that it is essential if we want to study knowledge as a fundamental part of a big social 
phenomenon. But having said that, I have the feeling inside that the classics (from 
Plato to Quine) had a good reason to consider testimony a rather secondary section in 
the epistemology project: what they were looking for were strategies for reliably gaining 
new knowledge, not just for reliably transmitting existing knowledge. Their problem 
was that, with few exceptions, they had an inappropriate, ‘Robinson Crusoe’ view of 
knowledge systems. In this sense, I think that an ‘economic’ approach, like the one I 
have followed elsewhere,1 is still more appropriate than an ‘ethical’ one, for economics 
has basically to do with the interactions between ‘demanders’ and ‘suppliers’ of valu-
able items (and, by the way, with the implication of different agents having different 
valuations of the same items, something the ethical approach tends to forget, by insist-
ing in ‘the’ value of knowledge as a single, objective quality). Fricker rightly insists in 
the fact that testimonial injustice wrongs people by denying their status, not just as 
‘witnesses’, but as reasoners, as providers and users of reasons. But I think this should 
have made her pay more attention to the ‘economy of arguments’, so to say, than just 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., J. Zamora Bonilla, “Science studies and the theory of games”, Perspectives on Science 14, 639-671, 
2006, and “Rhetoric, induction, and the free speech dilemma”, Philosophy of Science 73,175-193, 2006. 
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to what the new mainstream (or just last fashion) in analytic epistemology is discuss-
ing. 
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